Executive control of the judiciary: the appointment power in Russia
Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 2016, 32(3)

Judicial institutions and firms' external finance: evidence from Russia 
Lead article
Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 2013, 29(4) 
Honourable mention in Russia’s National Award in Applied Economics 2016

Distributive politics and electoral incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures
with Toke Aidt
Lead article
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2012, 4(3) 

                   Reply to a comment by Per Pettersson-Lidbom, posted on line

The new political economy of Russia
with Eric Berglöf, Andrei Kunov and Ksenia Yudaeva
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003

Working papers & work in progress

Persistent overconfidence and biased memory: Evidence from managers, 2019

with David Huffman, and Collin Raymond

Revise and resubmit, American Economic Review


We provide evidence of persistent overconfidence among managers in a firm, who face a high-powered tournament incentive scheme, and have very detailed feedback as well as substantial experience. This raises a question about the mechanisms by which the managers sustain overconfident believes and avoid drawing correct, if disappointing, conclusions from the substantial information they receive.  We show that memory plays a key role:  managers who are overconfident prop up their self-image by selectively forgetting unfavourable performance outcomes from the past.

Rank vs Money: Evidence from Managers, 2018

When firms use relative performance pay in which they rank employees, an employee’s behaviour may respond to the rank they get. What is the relative importance of rank effects compared to monetary incentives? What is the direction of rank effects? Arguably, a bad rank may generate desire to catch up, or it may discourage further effort.

In this paper we address these questions by analysing store managers in a large firm where the bonus is determined through a high powered tournament. We study managers’ response to feedback about their rank. In this tourna- ment, the bonus is a step function of rank, and so marginal incentives and rank have a non-monotonic relationship, allowing us to separate the impact of incentives from that of rank on behaviour of managers.

First, we find that managers ignore marginal incentives, but respond to rank. Second, their response suggests desire to catch up: when managers get a bad rank on either profit or service, they respond by improving performance. This response is monotonic in rank. Importantly, we show that managers achieve these improvements by making corresponding changes to labour and production, the key input variables directly under their control.

Girls will be Boys: Gender, Beliefs and Selection in the Field, in progress

with David Huffman, and Collin Raymond